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We propose a class of attacks on quantum key distribution (QKD) systems where an eavesdrop-
per actively engineers new loopholes by using damaging laser illumination to permanently change
properties of system components. This can turn a perfect QKD system into a completely inse-
cure system. A proof-of-principle experiment performed on an avalanche photodiode-based detector
shows that laser damage can be used to create loopholes. After ∼ 1W illumination, the detectors’
dark count rate reduces 2–5 times, permanently improving single-photon counting performance.
After ∼ 1.5W, the detectors switch permanently into the linear photodetection mode and become
completely insecure for QKD applications.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.62.Cf, 61.80.Ba, 85.60.Dw
Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables two remote
parties to grow a secret key [1]. The security relies on the
laws of physics, provided the components and the sys-
tem behave according to the models in the security proof
[2–4]. Practical implementations contain imperfections,
however, which may enable so-called quantum hacking
attacks [5–8]. Work is now in progress to restore security,
by modifying the implementations to avoid large loop-
holes [9–13], and generalizing the security proofs [2, 14–
17] to take the remaining, unavoidable imperfections into
account [18]. From these promising directions of research,
it may seem that quantum key distribution systems will
become nearly perfect in the future, in the sense that all
imperfections are either eliminated, or accounted for by
additional privacy amplification as quantified by security
proofs.
In other words, the eavesdropper Eve in QKD seems to
have a sad destiny. She initially had two tools in her suit-
case: attacking perfect QKD systems with optimal quan-
tum attacks, and quantum hacking attacks exploiting im-
perfections. The security proofs eliminated the first tool,
while the recent developments in implementations and
practical security proofs are about to eliminate the sec-
ond. However, in this Letter we demonstrate a third tool
in her suitcase. Eve may intentionally damage the sys-
tem, to actively engineer exploitable imperfections. In
this way, even an initially perfect setup can become to-
tally insecure, without raising any alarms. This clearly
demonstrates the fact that it is not sufficient to have well-
characterized components and systems. Eve may totally
change their behavior at some later point. The results ul-
timately question if communication security is physically
attainable at all, in principle.
Changes in characteristics of most optical components
inside a QKD system can lead to loopholes being created.
QKD schemes rely on known characteristics of, for exam-
ple, attenuators, beamsplitters, modulators, polarization
control components, spatial and spectral filters, optical
connectors, lenses, mirrors, light sources and detectors.
For a proof-of-principle demonstration of the new class
of attacks, we needed to pick a target component and
a target type of QKD system. A natural choice was
avalanche photodiode (APD) in a free-space system, for
the following reasons. A high-power laser beam is exper-
imentally easier to apply through free-space optics. The
APD absorbs most of the incoming light in a small area,
which makes it likely to suffer damage at lower power
than other optical components. We decided to investi-
gate a widely used Si APD (PerkinElmer C30902SH),
employed in single-photon detectors in several QKD ex-
periments [19–25]. For this component, we have demon-
strated permanent laser damage useful for eavesdropping,
as detailed below.
Initial tests showed that useful laser damage could be
achieved. For thorough characterization of effects we sub-
sequently built an automated setup (Fig. 1) that applied
damaging light in small increments, and fully character-
ized the APD in between the exposures [26]. The setup
tests a stand-alone APD, however the results are appli-
cable to a complete QKD system as discussed through
this Letter. High-power continuous-wave (c.w.) illumi-
nation is produced by electrically controlled 807 nm laser
diode, pigtailed with multimode (MM) fiber of 200µm
core diameter. The beam exiting the MM fiber is colli-
mated, passes through a 50:50 non-polarizing beamsplit-
ter (diverting half of the power into a power meter), a
mechanical shutter, and is focused at the APD in 50µm
full-width at half-maximum (FWHM) diameter spot. In
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FIG. 1. Experimental setup for APD damage and characterization. See text for details.
an actual attack, the wavelength of damaging laser would
have to be close to that of signal photons, because all free-
space QKD systems employ a narrowband interference
filter at the entrance to cut background light in the chan-
nel. Many of these systems operate in 770–850 nm wave-
length range [19–24], not far from the damaging laser
wavelength in our test.
In addition to the high-power laser, our setup has two
single-mode (SM) fiber pigtailed lasers and a variable at-
tenuator. These provide calibrated pulsed and c.w. illu-
mination for characterizing the APD. The APD is con-
nected into a standard passively-quenched single-photon
detector scheme, and thermoelectrically chilled to −25 ◦C
[27, 28]. The detector output is connected to a counter
and time interval analyzer. Bias is applied to the APD
from a programmable voltage source (HV), allowing mea-
surement of I–V curves and several electrical and optical
characteristics [26]. We measured detector dark count
rate and photon detection efficiency with APD biased
15V above its initial (undamaged) breakdown voltage
value Vbr orig., APD breakdown voltage Vbr, dark cur-
rent when biased in linear amplification mode 5V below
Vbr orig., and photoconversion quantum efficiency when
biased at 0V.
Most of our tests proceeded by applying a cycle of
c.w. illumination for 60 s, then characterizing the APD.
The power level was increased in small increments be-
tween the cycles. The software paused the experiment
and alerted the operator if any characterized parameter
deviated significantly from its initial value. Then the op-
erator would either continue the test to higher powers
and further destruction of the sample, or terminate the
test to check for sample’s long-term stability. Results of
the tests are plotted in Fig. 2.
We tested 10 samples of PerkinElmer C30902SH APD
in total, numbered APD-1 through APD-10 in this Let-
ter. The samples came from different production batches
manufactured in 2009–2010. The changes observed in
all samples after high-power illumination were generally
consistent between the samples and permanent, unless
noted otherwise. As we applied illumination of increas-
ing power, we observed seven distinct effects denoted by
vertical bands a–f in Fig. 2 and explained below.
a. After illumination of less than 0.25W power, dark
count rate of the APDs rose by several times. This is the
only non-permanent effect, dissipating after the APD is
left in darkness for several hours. (Also the only known,
noted in the APD data sheet.)
b. In 0.3 to 0.45W range, 4 out of 8 APDs tested in
this range exhibited rise of their Vbr by 2.3–2.5V. This
was accompanied by a reduction in their photon detection
efficiency by a factor of 0.83–0.90. Hypothesized mecha-
nism of the efficiency reduction is that while the APDs
are biased at a constant voltage in the detector, the rise
of Vbr lowered overvoltage (the difference between the
bias voltage and Vbr), leading to lower detection efficiency
[28, 29]. When attacking a complete Bob, Eve could thus
reduce sensitivity of a selected APD. This is because in-
dividual APDs are addressable by varying polarization or
other parameters of the damaging light at Bob’s input.
This would create a permanent efficiency mismatch be-
tween Bob’s detectors [5]. This efficiency mismatch can
potentially increase Eve’s knowledge of the key, if Bob
does not recharacterize his detectors or accounts for such
imperfections in the postprocessing procedure.
c. In 0.5 to 0.8W range, all APD parameters returned
to normal, with the exception of the dark count rate
that remarkably fell 1.7–5.4 times comparing to the orig-
inal dark count rate measured before starting the treat-
ment. The dark count rate reduction was observed in all
8 samples tested in this power range, and the change has
been verified to be permanent. This is to our knowledge
the first demonstration that Eve can improve legitimate
user’s equipment. The default treatment of all errors in
3FIG. 2. Results of applying high-power illumination to ten
APD samples. The data points show APD and detector pa-
rameters measured after each successive application of illumi-
nation of increasing peak power. The leftmost point on each
trace is the initial value of parameter prior to illumination.
QKD is that they resulted from eavesdropping, regardless
of the actual error source. Detector dark counts therefore
limit the maximum transmission distance of a given sys-
tem, raising the quantum bit error rate (QBER) beyond
the secure limit as the photon transmission probability
drops. With some extra assumptions or complications
in the detection setup, it is possible to improve QKD
performance beyond this limit [30, 31]. Similarly, it is
tempting to simply subtract a calibrated dark count rate
from the QBER. Our result clearly shows that this can
be dangerous; all errors in the raw key must be treated
as caused by eavesdropping [31].
d. In 0.9 to 1.2W range, the dark count rate perma-
nently rose to large values.
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FIG. 3. Detector control characteristics of a permanently
blinded APD-1, at different overvoltage values. Note that
trigger pulse power needs to change less than 3 dB (i.e., less
than 2 times) for a change of click probability from 0 to
>0.5, at typical operating overvoltages of the APD in 10–
15V range. This would allow a perfect or near-perfect faked-
state attack on QKD system [7, 32, 33]. Note that perfect
deterministic 0-or-1 click probability control, as evident at
overvoltages ≤ 11V, is not required for a successful attack.
Even probabilistic control at larger overvoltages should suffice
to break security in most if not all practical settings [34].
e. In 1.2 to 1.7W range, the APDs developed large
dark current. This led to blinding of the passively-
quenched detector, dropping the photon detection effi-
ciency and dark count rate to zero in both samples tested
in this range. The blinding mechanism is that excessive
current drawn by the APD from the bias circuit (in our
case from 400 kΩ ballast resistor) leads to the voltage
supplied by the circuit dropping below Vbr, as previously
demonstrated by weaker c.w. illumination [35]. The dif-
ference here is that the laser damage blinding is perma-
nent and does not require continuing illumination. Under
the blinded condition the detector remains photosensitive
to moderately bright light and is either perfectly control-
lable or well-controllable (depending on overvoltage op-
erating setpoint) by 10 ns wide light pulses, see Fig. 3.
This renders it insecure for QKD applications [7, 8, 33].
f. At ≥ 2W, catastrophic structural damage took
place. We tested 3 samples to this power range. In one
of them (APD-10, single experimental point at 2W in
Fig. 2) the bonding wires melted off, leaving the device
an open circuit. The other two reduced then completely
lost all photosensitivity, with the device becoming a re-
sistor in 10–100 kΩ range. If this APD were employed
for a watchdog power meter as in one countermeasure
proposal [7], the countermeasure would be defeated.
Later stages of damage result in visible changes to the
APD chip (Fig. 4). The first visible change is disfiguring
of the gold electrode, possibly resulting from Si–Au alloy
formation at > 370 ◦C [36]. In the last stage of damage,
the laser beam always produces a hole in Si chip.
The permanent reduction of dark count rate is an inter-
esting effect. We tested most of our samples illuminated
with 50µm-focused, 60 s square pulses of successively in-
creasing power levels, and kept the detector high-voltage
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FIG. 4. Microscope images of APDs at various stages of dam-
age. (a) APD package with Si chip behind a glass window; the
other images show chip close-ups. (b) Untreated APD-3. (c)
APD-3 after 0.65W illumination, which has reduced the dark
count rate and produced no visible damage. (d)–(e) APD-1
after 2W illumination, showing re-melted gold electrode and
gold flowing into clear area along Si crystal lattice planes; this
sample has large dark current but unchanged quantum effi-
ciency. (f) APD-2 after 3W illumination with a hole blown
in the middle through the entire thickness of the silicon chip;
it has zero photosensitivity, resistor-like state. Damaging il-
lumination in all cases was applied for 60 s. Images (b)–(e)
were taken with bright-field illumination, (d) chip surface in-
tentionally tilted, (f) dark-field illumination.
source at Vbr orig. + 15V through the test. However we
have also tested with a single 60 s square pulse applied to
a fresh sample (APD-7); with illumination slowly linearly
ramped up in 900 s, kept constant for 60 s then linearly
ramped down to zero in 900 s (APD-4); with illumina-
tion defocused such that the spot became larger than
the APD photosensitive area (APD-6); finally, with the
high-voltage source switched off for the duration of laser
treatment (APD-8). In all cases we observed permanent
reduction of dark count rate. It appears that the main
cause of it is heating the APD chip to a certain peak
temperature. A similar effect has previously been ob-
served and attributed to localized annealing when APD
junction was heated by electrical current [36].
The results of testing this component clearly support
that Eve may, in general, alter the system character-
istics by altering characteristics of its optical compo-
nents. Then the system no longer complies with the
security proof. Then, even with a sufficiently general
security proof, and with a QKD implementation that is
pre-characterized to comply with the security proof, se-
curity cannot be guaranteed. The countermeasure can
be to characterize the system more frequently to ensure
the validity of the characterization. One could imagine
doing this whenever an unusual event was detected, as
the bright power of the damaging laser surely has a tem-
porary signature on the system. Meanwhile, it is dif-
ficult to exhaustively list all events that should trigger
a recharacterization. Eve could for instance wait for a
power outage, and perform the damage when the system
is unpowered.
It is therefore advisable to monitor the characteris-
tics of the system directly during QKD, or at least such
that the characteristics are bounded during QKD with
a sufficiently high probability. Thus the security proofs
should minimize the number of necessary characteristics
about the system. One example is the Bennett-Brassard-
Mermin 1992 (BBM92) scheme where the source of en-
tangled photons does not need to be characterized [37].
Another example is the proof for measurement-device-
independent QKD systems [11] that has no necessary
characterized parameters for the Bell-state analyzer in-
cluding the detectors. Yet another example is the secu-
rity proof in Ref. [16], where the secure key generation
rate is only dependent on one imperfection parameter at
Bob’s side, namely the minimum detection efficiency of
a nonvacuum state incident to Bob.
On the implementation side, it turns slightly into a
cat-and-mouse game, where Alice and Bob must ensure
that the in-field characterization during QKD is reliable
and untampered by Eve. Optical power limiters is a well-
studied technology that may be applied against tamper-
ing at the entrances of Alice and Bob [38], and using a
watchdog power meter has been proposed [7, 39]. How-
ever our results clearly show that Eve might tamper with
these countermeasures. In a more narrow example, de-
tectors can be tested for single-photon sensitivity at ran-
dom times to bound the minimum detection efficiency
[9]. Again, to do this in-field is not trivial, and the secu-
rity then again relies on the pre-characterization of the
single-photon source and path used for testing. A re-
liable in-field scheme to characterize crucial equipment
parameters during operation can be a future study.
Finally, our study shows the practical challenge of
physically securing a QKD system from all side-channels.
This is one of the most fundamental assumptions in most
security proofs (even in the device-independent security
proofs [40]), and possibly the hardest to fully character-
ize. For example, one can envision a situation where Eve
damages the detectors or other crucial components, not
by using the fiber, but rather by focusing high-power X-
ray radiation onto the components from outside of the
system. Another, probably future way to gain access
could be a nanorobot burrowing through the fiber core.
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